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The case of military drones1 can serve as an example of the failure of philosophy to live 
up to the intricacies of the real world. In the dreams of some philosophers, drones are 
the perfect weapons. According to their advocates, they are meant to be precise in ways 
previously unimaginable and characterized by increased effectiveness and drastic 
reductions in collateral damage (Strawser 2013; Beauchamp & Savulescu 2013). Yet, 
even if drones make it easier to wage war, the reason why they do so may not be the one 
commonly assumed within the philosophical debate among (military) ethicists – 
namely, the promised reduction in casualties on either side. Rather, one could question 
whether drones, after all, lead to the prospects of reducing casualties – or if they, in fact, 
ultimately increase them. This paper will scrutinize the reasoning behind the arguments 
supporting the deployment of drones to search for alternative claims embedded in the 
political intricacies of international relations and domestic politics. 
Not only can the military case for using drones appear to be rock solid, the ethical 
case for the deployment of drones seems to be, in principle, just as strong. From an 
ethical point of view, drones are supposed to be win-win. Those that deploy drones 
profit because of increased precision, effectiveness, speed and, crucially, the fact that 
drones are unmanned. Those features, in turn, increase operational possibilities and 
reduce risk – a strategist’s dream. But also for the people living under them, drones can 
have significant advantages, in particular with respect to the promised reduction in 
collateral damage. In fact, there is evidence from both Pakistan and Libya about drones 
being welcomed by those attacked as well as by those attacking (see for example 
Beauchamp & Savulescu 2013; Franke 2014).2 Even former President Obama has made 
the point that using drones in Pakistan is much more acceptable – to the Pakistanis 
themselves – than using ground troops or traditional aircraft.   
Obama could consistently present himself as a pacificator (and win the Nobel 
Peace Prize) because his government conducted an increasing number of military 
                                                
 1A quick note about my terminology: I am using ‘drones’ just because it is the most common word for 
‘unmanned aerial vehicles’ (UAV’s), but my discussion is not restricted to aerial vehicles exclusively.  
2 The situations and the different interests on the ground both in Libya and Pakistan are so complicated 
that it is very difficult to use this as solid evidence. Libyans and Pakistanis who welcomed the 
deployment of drones are not the same ones who are being targeted by drones. 
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operations from within the wire of a US base. Thus, forget about boots on the ground, 
the drone pilots may just as well wear flip-flops. To be clear, this is a view that Obama 
has himself publicly expressed, for example in his ‘Remarks by the President at the 
National Defense University’ on May 23, 2013 (Franke 2014, 130). In that speech, 
Obama warned about the risk that manned operations would “lead [the US] to be 
viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences,” and “may 
trigger a major international crisis.” As Franke (2014) plausibly points out, it is not hard 
to read Obama’s words as a suggestion that drones are less controversial and therefore 
easier to use than traditional military forces. Thus, following that logic, everyone should 
be supportive of drone strikes: Not just perpetrators, but targets too; real people just as 
much as moral philosophers.  
However, when calculating combat strategy, it is important not to forget about the 
actual political situation. Reality creeps in and spoils the philosopher’s carefully 
constructed vision. In less than a decade, unmanned military drones have revolutionized 
the politics of war. In a way that is quite independent of their specific technical 
development, drones have become a symbol and placeholder for the technologization of 
war (and peace). Increasing automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence both within 
the military and civilian life are an extremely significant development, comparable to 
the possibilities facilitated by the Internet and digital revolution (Floridi 2014). Think 
about the actual data on collateral damage in Pakistan3 or the increasing asymmetry 
between the few countries that can afford the deployment of military drones. Without 
even having to add further examples, we obtain the following, simple dialectics: 
Starting from similar premises and aspirations – less war, less killing, less suffering – 
ethical and political considerations seem to point in different, indeed opposite, 
directions.  
The ethics of drones appears to suggest that we should welcome their deployment 
and wish for more drone operations and fewer old-fashioned, dirtier operations. 
However, the politics of drone deployment points to the idea that using drones will 
make it easier to wage wars and justify killing, which is also, ultimately, the case from a 
legal point of view (nowhere else other than in Plato’s Republic do the moral 
philosophers, after all, make the laws). The aim of this paper is not, however, to 
replicate either the extensive ethical or the political debates on these subjects.4 Rather I 
would like to push this debate forward by looking at how we ought to compare and 
evaluate the different kinds of considerations within these debates. In doing so, the hope 
is to enter a dialogue in which we academics stop talking past each other and make our 
scholarly debates more visible for policy makers. I will pursue this effort by looking at 
                                                
3 For some updated statistics, please see this recent article in Foreign Policy: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/drones-kill-more-civilians-than-pilots-do/ 
4  The academic debate is extensive. See, for example: Singer 2009, Paust 2010, Strawser 2010, 
Brunstetter & Braun 2011, Enemark 2011, Gregory 2011, Wall & Monahan 2011, Byman 2013, 
Coeckelbergh 2013, Cronin 2013, Enemark 2013, Strawser 2013, Williams 2013, and Franke 2014. Also 
see Di Nucci 2014a, Di Nucci & Santoni de Sio 2014, Santoni de Sio & Di Nucci 2016, Di Nucci & 
Santoni de Sio 2016 and Di Nucci forthcoming.  
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one particular argument: That is the idea that drones make it easier to wage war – or, 
differently put, the thesis that drones lower the threshold for going to war. 
 
 
Humanitarian Interventions and the Threshold for Waging War  
 
We should not assume, however, that this consideration is necessarily used to argue 
against the development or deployment of drones. There is serious dispute in the 
literature about the idea that making wars easier to wage is essentially a bad thing. Zack 
Beauchamp and Julian Savulescu, for example, have used the idea that drones lower the 
threshold for waging war to argue that drones make humanitarian interventions both 
more likely and more effective. They suggest that “[…] lowering the threshold is not, as 
commonly assumed, necessarily a bad thing. In at least one case, the bug is in fact a 
feature: drones have the potential to significantly improve the practice of humanitarian 
intervention” (Beauchamp & Savulescu 2013, 106). 
Beauchamp and Savulescu make an interesting and well-documented case for how 
aversion to causalities among one’s own soldiers can negatively influence the decision 
to intervene (they refer to the Clinton Administration’s decision to stay out of Rwanda) 
as well as the effectiveness of those humanitarian interventions that do take place (in 
this case they refer to Kosovo). In the latter case, it is both in terms of the intervener’s 
capability to prevent atrocities, but also in terms of collateral damages caused by the 
intervener (here Bosnia, which the authors do not discuss, may provide an even better 
example than Kosovo).  
The point is supposed to be a simple one: With drones reducing or even 
eliminating one’s own casualties we can expect more (and more effective) humanitarian 
interventions; thus, if we follow Beauchamp and Savulescu’s argument, lowering the 
threshold for going to war is not necessarily a bad thing, it can actually have some 
significant positive consequences. There are four different elements to this argument:  
 
a) The claim that drones reduce one’s own casualties; 
b) The claim that drones make war more likely; 
c) The claim that (b) is true because of (a). Beauchamp and Savulescu refer to this 
as “the assumption that drones make war more likely by lowering the risk of 
casualties to the side employing them” (2013, 2).   
d) The claim that (c) is not necessarily bad because humanitarian interventions are 
wars too.  
 
Concerning (a) (“drones reduce one’s own casualties”) and (b) (“drones make war more 
likely”), I do not suggest that there is an equivalence between them. This is both 
because the latter would constitute, at best, a consequence of the former, but also 
because there may be other intervening factors. As it is evident in (c) (“drones make 
war more likely by lowering the risk of casualties”), Beauchamp and Savulescu do not 
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keep these arguments apart. For my purpose, it is not particularly important to keep the 
two apart, which is why I have followed their formulation of ‘making war more likely’. 
In my opinion, the interesting point in this argumentation is, however, not the one 
Beauchamp and Savulescu argue against – namely, that lowering the threshold for 
waging war is always or necessarily bad – but rather the question of whether lowering 
the threshold for going to war is, overall, something that we should welcome. Even 
once we have accepted that humanitarian interventions can be seen as wars and have 
also agreed that drones will bring about more (and more effective) humanitarian 
interventions, the question remains as to whether this positive development will 
compensate other possible negative consequences of a general lowering of the 
threshold. Namely, all the other wars which might otherwise not have been fought had 
drones not lowered the threshold. 
 In this context, the term ‘wars’ may, however, be misleading. The development 
that drones are speeding up military interventions precisely challenges the very concept 
of war. Due to the increased violence that drones allow for – i.e. targeted killings – 
drone operations do not count as war in the traditional sense. One cannot deliver a 
reliable result by just comparing the number of just and unjust wars that would not 
otherwise have been fought had it not been for drones. That is, the unjust violence (that 
would not have been committed had it not been for drones) might not count as war, 
while the just violence – say humanitarian interventions – might still resemble 
traditional warfare. This is not the place to develop this point to any satisfactory extent, 
but it is worth remembering how drones may be changing our concepts related to what 
counts as war. I will, however, not press this point and move on to the other elements of 
the argument.  
 
 
Drones and the Reduction of Casualties 
 
I argue that (a) “drones reduce one’s own casualties” is a plausible empirical claim, with 
the caveat that removing soldiers from the battle-space does not necessarily reduce 
one’s own casualties since it can cause more civilian casualties back home through acts 
of terrorism. This is, again, a pretty simple point: Aversion to one’s own casualties 
should not be seen as a point specific to military casualties, but just as one aspect in a 
much wider concern for one’s own citizens. And if drones reduce operational casualties 
among military personnel and, in doing so, increase civilian casualties back home, then 
it would no longer be clear that (a) would still be true. Indeed, the truth of (a) would be 
very hard to establish, because it would depend on a comparative principle between the 
lives of one’s own non-combatants and the lives of one’s own combatants, not to speak 
of the difficulty of even defining these groups (see Fabre 2009). 
The question of whether drones may increase one’s own civilian casualties is, 
again, to a great extent an empirical one. Thus, I will not pursue it here in any great 
detail, but only state following more general observation: The decreasing availability of 
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combatants (as targets) in the battle-space coincides with a significant and well-
documented increase of civilians in battle-space from NGOs and all sorts of private 
contractors to modern private military companies who should probably count as 
combatants (Liu 2015).5  
The question of whether or not increased deployment of drones and other 
unmanned technologies may also increase civilian casualties among those countries that 
are deploying drones is not simply settled by looking at acts of terrorism. It also 
requires attention to what happens to the non-combatants of the deploying country (and 
maybe even its allies) in the battle-space. Certainly, it is not just a question of whether 
terrorism or acts of violence against non-combatants are increasing, but whether they 
are increasing because of the decreasing availability of combatants (as targets) in the 
battle-space, which drones and other technological developments are accelerating. 
This issue is very interesting also from a normative point of view. One question is 
whether drones are increasing violence against the non-combatants of the deploying 
countries; an altogether different question is whether the decreasing availability of 
combatants (as targets) in the battle-space makes a difference to the normativity of 
violence against the non-combatants of the deploying country. It could be argued that 
because what used to be legitimate targets are being increasingly geographically 
removed from the battle-space, then targets that used to be illegitimate can increasingly 
become less so. One could object, however, that the geographical location of the enemy 
ought to make no difference to the legitimacy of attacking civilians or non-combatants. 
Drones do not change anything because non-combatants remain illegitimate targets 
while combatants under certain conditions (such as immediate threats) remain 
legitimate targets. So, the idea is that there is no normative difference – in terms of non-
combatants’ liability to be attacked – resulting from the development or deployment of 
drones.   
This point is not quite obvious. As emphasized earlier, the increasing deployment 
of drones means fewer military personnel in the battle-space, but at the same time an 
increasing presence of civilians in the battle-space. But there is also another element, 
which is more specific to drones. Drone operators are now able to increasingly conduct 
a life that is much more similar to civilian life than to traditional military deployment, 
and they can do so while they still constitute an immediate threat for the enemy. This is 
because drone operators are able to live at home with their families and simultaneously 
fly deadly missions during working hours (Di Nucci & Santoni de Sio 2016; 
Kirkpatrick 2016). It is an interesting question whether the fact that drone operators are 
now in war and yet able to mingle with non-combatants make those non-combatants 
liable to attack; for instance, in the form of collateral damage as a strike on a drone 
operator on her way to work.6 Of course, one could insist that drone operators are 
                                                
5 A further complication is that military personnel are increasingly being given peacekeeping and training 
tasks.  
6 On the ethics of collateral damages and double effect, see also Ethics Without Intention (Di Nucci 
2014b).   
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mostly liable to be attacked when they are active in service – and, as long as we hold on 
to this principle,7 there is no novelty and no normative difference. That would then 
mean, interestingly, that through technological development a country is not just 
materially increasing the safety of its combatants but also normatively diminishing their 
liability.8  
 
 
Why Do We (not) Go to War? 
 
The plausibility of (b) and (c) is worth considering in some detail. It may be that it is 
both true that ‘drones reduce one’s own casualties’ and that ‘drones make war more 
likely’, but it may not be true that ‘drones make war more likely because they reduce 
one’s own casualties’. In other words, both (a) and (b) may be true while (c) could still 
be false if (b) is true independently of (a). In this context, Obama’s speech serves as an 
example once more. Obama defends drone operations in Pakistan not by referring to 
their benefits in terms of risks to US troops, but rather by arguing that unmanned 
operations are more acceptable both for the country where (or against which) they are 
conducted and for the international community. Assuming that Obama is right about 
this, it could only be the case, if the reason why drone operations would be more 
acceptable is the fact of casualty reduction. But it is unlikely that this is what Obama 
was actually referring to, given his remark that traditional operations would “lead [the 
US] to be viewed as occupying armies.” It is therefore much more likely that Obama 
was referring to drone operations being more acceptable over and above the reduction 
of casualties among own ranks.9 Interestingly, there is (as mentioned) some evidence 
from both Pakistan and Libya reporting it to be easier for local authorities to accept 
drone operations rather than other kinds of operations, which is supposedly what 
Obama may have been referring to. Additionally, drone operations are much more 
difficult for the media to report on, which again may at least in part explain why drones 
are taken to be easier to be accepted by the international community. Finally, since they 
are unmanned, drone operations are not subject to the same procedures and laws as 
other traditional operations.  
                                                
7 This principle may indeed be challenged. For example, there seems to be a broad acceptance of 
‘targeted killings’ of enemies that are either of unclear combatant status or not actively involved in 
attacks (e.g. high profile leaders of terrorist networks). One may therefore raise questions about the 
‘moral equality of quasi-combatants.’ But I do not have the space to address this here. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for suggesting this.  
8 An example of this could be the following: While traditional soldiers may have been liable to attack 
while resting in their base and not actively in service, drone operators are not liable to attack while resting 
if they do so at home. 
9 Referring to what Obama may have meant rather than to what is true or right is, in this case, legitimate 
because Obama is the decision-maker. And the issue under discussion is the empirical one of whether or 
not drones will make wars more likely and why (rather than some related normative issue). So, given the 
issue, what decision-makers think is not just pertinent, but also decisive (with the caveat, obviously, that 
what Obama says in public may not necessarily reflect his (Administration’s) views or reasons). 
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These different elements share several important features: They may constitute reasons 
why drones make waging war easier and therefore lower the threshold for waging war 
(or ‘state-sponsored violence’) while also making no reference to reducing casualties in 
one’s own ranks. These ideas may explain the (supposed) views of the Obama 
Administration. But it is different from that put forward by Beauchamp and Savulescu 
as it even allows for the following possibility: Namely, that drones do make waging war 
easier by lowering the threshold while at the same time increasing casualties in one’s 
own ranks (say by causing more acts of terrorism against one’s own non-combatants). 
Even though I have offered no evidence for this conclusion, the arguments that I have 
analyzed are not able to rule it out either. And this is significant since the scenario in 
which drones make wars easier to wage is, in a way, the worst possible outcome. In this 
scenario, both those who deploy drones and those against whom drones are deployed 
are losing. One reason to consider this a plausible outcome could be that civilian 
casualties due to terrorism would in a certain sense be better ‘accepted’ by the public 
than combatant casualties (and thus easier to ‘sell’) because it is simply less obvious 
that the former is a result of the government’s military policies and strategies than the 
latter.10  
To sum up: We started from the idea that drones may be a win-win situation by 
promising advantages to both sides, but ended up not even being able to rule out the 
possibility that drones are, actually a lose-lose. Moreover, the philosophical assumption 
that drones will make wars more likely by reducing one’s own casualties is not, it turns 
out, doomsday pessimism. It may actually be overly optimistic by misreading the 
politics of choosing drone operations over more traditional operations. This is, to be 
clear, not incompatible with Beauchamp and Savulescu’s argument as they do not argue 
for the idea that drones make wars more likely by reducing one’s own casualties, but 
rather assume this point to offer an evaluation of (some) of its consequences. Still, my 
argument questions not only their assumption but their general claim, which is 
prominent in the debate on drones: This is not simply the coarse claim that ‘drones 
make war more likely,’ but also the more fine-grained version of it according to which 
‘drones make war more likely by reducing one’s own casualties.’ Thus, Beauchamp and 
Savulescu may be right, and indeed I have no objections to the content of their 
argument. Symptomatically, though, they may have made their argument irrelevant (or 
anyway less interesting) by misreading political realities on the ground, in particular in 
respect to how important casualty reduction actually is for decisions on war and peace.11  
 
 
                                                
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
11 In future research, it will also be worth thinking about the relative importance of various kinds of 
casualties, such as enemy combatants, friendly combatants, enemy civilians, friendly civilians, agents of 
contested status etc. (see Fabre 2009). This can and probably should be done, as this article suggests, not 
only in terms of military ethics and just war theory, but also in terms of the effect that these differences 
can have in perceived acceptability and political decision-making. Again, thanks to a referee for this 
suggestion.  
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